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THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT LITIGATION IN THE
IMMIGRATION DETENTION CONTEXT
Jennifer Safstrom*

Abstract
This Article analyzes how the Thirteenth Amendment has been used to prevent
forced labor practices in immigration detention. The Article assesses the effectiveness
of Thirteenth Amendment litigation by dissecting cases where detainees have
challenged the legality of labor requirements under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act. Given the expansion in immigration detention, the increasing privatization of
detention, and the significant human rights implications of this issue, the arguments
advanced in this Article are not only currently relevant but have the potential to
shape ongoing dialogue on this subject.
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Introduction
Across the country, detainees in the custody of the United States
Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) allege they are being coerced into performing work without proper compensation, often under the threat of punishment or under
other forcible conditions. 1 The immigrant plaintiffs in one such case—
Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc.—filed a lawsuit alleging violations of federal
law prohibiting forced labor by the for-profit company managing and
operating the facility. 2 The complaint asserts that detainees were forced
by GEO Group (“GEO”) to work for either token pay ($1/day) or no
pay to perform the following range of tasks:
Plaintiffs scrubbed bathrooms, showers, toilets, and windows
throughout GEO’s Aurora facility. They cleaned and maintained GEO’s on-site medical facility, cleaned the medical facility’s toilets, floors and windows, cleaned patient rooms and
medical staff offices, swept, mopped, stripped, and waxed the
floors of the medical facility, did medical facility laundry,
swept, mopped, stripped, and waxed floors throughout the facility, did detainee laundry, prepared and served detainee
meals, assisted in preparing catered meals for law enforcement
events sponsored by GEO, performed clerical work for GEO,
prepared clothing for newly arriving detainees, provided barber services to detainees, ran the facility’s law library, cleaned
the facility’s intake area and solitary confinement unit, deep
cleaned and prepared vacant portions of the facility for newly

1. See Michelle Chen, ICE’s Captive Immigrant Labor Force, NATION (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/ices-captive-immigrant-labor-force
[https://perma.cc/5BBU-5PCR].
2. See Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo. 2017), aff’d, 882
F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 143, 202 L. Ed. 2d 34 (2018).
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arriving detainees, cleaned the facility’s warehouse, and maintained the exterior and landscaping of the GEO building, inter
alia. 3
The detainees in these facilities allege that they were forced to do
various types of labor, including administrative, janitorial, housekeeping,
landscaping, and maintenance work. The complaint also alleges that individuals who refused to work were subject to threats of discipline including punishment in solitary confinement if they failed to comply. 4 This
scheme of underpayment or nonpayment “unjustly enriched [the company] when it paid its employees $1 per day, or nothing at all, for their labor.” 5
This Article seeks to analyze how legislation developed pursuant to
the Thirteenth Amendment can be used to prevent forced labor in immigrant detention settings. In addition to analyzing the effectiveness of these
legal challenges brought under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(“TVPA”), the Article assesses how these arguments can impact current
litigation, legislation, and public action across the country.
Given the expansion in immigration detention, the increasing privatization of detention, and the significant human rights implications of
this issue, this Article is critical in the current moment and can be used to
shape ongoing dialogue on this subject. This Article assesses the role that
Thirteenth Amendment litigation in the immigration detention context
can play in rectifying inequities at the intersection of race, immigration,
and labor.
I. Contextualizing the Thirteenth Amendment in the
Immigration Detention Setting
A. The Immigration Detention Context
In assessing whether the Thirteenth Amendment should be used in
the immigration detention context, it is key to understand the
circumstances in which it would be applied and who would be impacted.
The immigrant detainee population is primarily comprised of people of
color, more of whom are being held in detention and are being detained
for longer periods of time than ever before.

3. Complaint at 2-3, Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo.
filed Oct. 22, 2014) (No. 14-cv-02887).
4. See id. at 3.
5. Id. at 2.
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Immigrants are mostly people of color: the percent of white, nonHispanic immigrants has dropped from nearly fifty percent in 1980 to
under twenty percent in 2018. 6 According to Pew Research Center data,
the top five countries of origin for immigrants to the United States in
2018 were Mexico, China, India, Philippines, and El Salvador. 7 Moreover, per data collected by Freedom for Immigrants, the top countries of
birth for immigrants in detention are Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala. 8 This data reflects the changing demographics of the immigrant population.9
The length of immigration detention is also increasing. In some cases, ICE detains immigrants while pursuing deportation. 10 Reports from
the TRAC Immigration Project, which systematically reviews federal
government data, indicate highly variable lengths of detention among detainees. In 2012, of 1,500 individuals detained, 40 percent had their case
“dispositions occur[] very quickly, within three days,” and 70 percent
had their “ICE custody ended during the first month.” 11 Short detention
durations can be attributed to the number of individuals who “did not

6. Abby Budiman, Christine Tamir, Lauren Mora & Luis Noe-Bustamante, Facts on
U.S. Immigrants, 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org
/hispanic/2019/06/03/facts-on-u-s-immigrants-trend-data/ [https://perma.cc/2YHHHNTS].
7. Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/03/key-findingsabout-u-s-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/D658-2RTT].
8. Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www.freedom
forimmigrants.org/detention-statistics [https://perma.cc/VK9B-NHH6] (last visited Sept.
27, 2020).
9. See id. Data compiled by Freedom for Immigrants, based on “thousands of intakes
with people in immigration detention,” illustrates that individuals aged 26 to 35 years old
are the largest age group being detained, followed by 36 to 45 years olds and subsequently
by individuals under the age of 25.
10. Section 1226(a) of the INA provides that, “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the” country, “the Attorney General (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on (A) bond of at least $1,500 . . . or
(B) conditional parole[.]” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226 (West 2020). The inability to pay is but one
factor that might cause an individual to be detained. See Brianna Hill, Issues with Interpretation, Video-Teleconferencing, and More in Chicago’s Immigration Bond Court, CHI. APPLESEED
FUND FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2020), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/ourblog/preliminary-findings-immigration-observations/ [https://perma.cc/UA85-BEDX]
(reporting that although “about 30% of detained immigrants were able to secure an immigration custody decision that allowed them to be released upon paying bond” in 2018,
about one-fifth of detainees granted bond “remain in custody until the end of their case,
most likely because of their inability to pay their bond”).
11. Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE: IMMIGRATION (June 3, 2013), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/321/ [https://perma.cc/8N4Y-SR3D].
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contest their deportation” and may “indicat[e] that ICE did not need to
obtain court approval to deport these individuals.” 13 Even in the midst of
increasingly lengthy detention periods, the American Immigration Council found “the average detention length was consistently and substantially
longer in privately operated facilities” than at those that were publiclyoperated. 14
Differences in detention duration are especially evident when making state-by-state comparisons. In California, 50 percent of individuals
“spent less than a day in ICE custody and nearly three quarters spent
three days or less in lockup.” 15 In South Carolina and Alabama, however,
only three percent of immigrants “were detained for three days or less.”16
In states that detain individuals for longer periods of time, each day presents a new opportunity for unpaid labor to be requested. The population
of detained immigrants has also increased steadily over the years from approximately 6,800 in 1994 to 49,500 in early 2019, rising about 625 percent over the last two and a half decades. 17 Yet, it seems that even this
may be a conservative estimate, as other reports suggest the immigration
population in detention exceeds 55,000, which would be over a 700 percent increase since 1994. 18
Reports from within these detention centers often reveal shockingly
atrocious conditions. The management of these facilities often reflects an
extreme lack of care, 19 resulting in detainees’ inadequate access to medical

12. Id.
13. Detention by the Numbers, supra note 8; November 2017 ICE Detention Facility Lists,
NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/
373733514/November-2017-ICE-Detention-Facility-Lists#fromembed
[https://perma.cc/5AZE-NFPH].
14. EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE LANDSCAPE OF
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_landscape_
of_immigration_detention_in_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3RY-WY2B].
15. Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Katie Sullivan & Jeff Mason, Immigration Detention in the United States: A Primer,
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/
immigration-detention-in-the-united-states-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/5MFB-3TMV].
18. Isabela Dias, ICE is Detaining More People Than Ever—and for Longer, PACIFIC
STANDARD (Aug. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/ice-is-detaining-more-people-thanever-and-for-longer [https://perma.cc/X7FM-G8UB] (reporting that there were
“55,185 people in ICE’s custody, which represents a jump of almost 3,000 in comparison
to just last week (which was already a record)”).
19. See, e.g., Monsy Alvarado, Ashley Balcerzak, Stacey Barchenger, Jon Campbell,
Rafael Carranza, Maria Clark, Alan Gomez, Daniel Gonzalez, Trevor Hughes, Rick Jervis, Dan Keemahill, Rebecca Plevin, Jeremy Schwartz, Sarah Taddeo, Lauren Villagran,
Dennis Wagner, Elizabeth Weise & Alissa Zhu, ‘These People Are Profitable’: Under Trump,
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care, sexual abuse, and inhumane conditions of detention. Yet, the
government’s lack of basic data tracking, 23 penchant for destroying records, 24 and decreased oversight 25 all allow these conditions to persist.

Private Prisons Are Cashing in on ICE Detainees, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2019/12/19/ice-detention-privateprisons-expands-under-trump-administration/4393366002/ [https://perma.cc/7XWF8C53] (reporting “400 allegations of sexual assault or abuse, inadequate medical care, regular hunger strikes, frequent use of solitary confinement, more than 800 instances of physical force against detainees, nearly 20,000 grievances filed by detainees and at least 29 fatalities, including seven suicides, since Trump took office in January 2017”); BBC,
Trump Migrant Separation Policy: Children ‘In Cages’ in Texas (June 18, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44518942 [https://perma.cc/X5TV28EK]; Caitlin Dickerson, Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Cannot Be Found,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/us/migrantchildren-separated.html; Rachel Treisman, Whistleblower Alleges ‘Medical Neglect,’ Questionable Hysterectomies Of ICE Detainees, NPR (Sept. 16, 2020 4:43 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/913398383/whistleblower-alleges-medical-neglectquestionable-hysterectomies-of-ice-detaine [https://perma.cc/BX79-3G78] (complaint
allegations included: performing sterilizations without consent or medical necessity, “refusing to test detainees for COVID-19, shredding medical requests submitted by detained
immigrants, fabricating medical records, allowing employees to work while symptomatic
and awaiting COVID-19 test results, withholding information from detainees and employees about who has tested positive, underreporting COVID-19 cases, and allowing the
transfer of detained immigrants, including those who have tested positive for the virus”).
20. See, e.g., Hamed Aleaziz, Another Immigrant Has Died in ICE Custody. She’s
The Eighth Since October., BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020, 7:13 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigrant-died-ice-custodyhealthcare-hospital-asylum [https://perma.cc/T679-BCLZ] (reporting death of 22-yearold Guatemalan woman as “the eighth [fatality] in ICE custody in the 2020 fiscal year,
which began Oct. 1, and equals the number of deaths for the entire 2019 fiscal year”);
US: Poor Medical Care, Deaths, in Immigrant Detention, HUMAN RTS. WATCH
(June 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/20/us-poor-medical-care-deathsimmigrant-detention# [https://perma.cc/DHW4-9JW4].
21. See, e.g., Alice Speri, Detained, Then Violated: 1,224 Complaints Reveal a Staggering
Pattern of Sexual Abuse in Immigration Detention. Half of Those Accused Worked for ICE.,
INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/11/
immigration-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/57M2-HTEK] (noting
1,224 complaints from January 2010 to September 2017, but only 43 investigations during the same time period; also observing that in nearly 60 percent of cases “an officer or
private detention contractor [w]as the perpetrator of the alleged abuse” and that one-third
of complaints assert “an officer either directly witnessed the alleged abuse or was made
aware of it”).
22. See, e.g., Ellen Gallagher, The Other Problem with ICE Detention: Solitary Confinement, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/
08/28/other-problem-with-ice-detention-solitary-confinement/; John Washington,
The Epidemic of Hunger Strikes in Immigrant Detention Centers, NATION (Feb. 13,
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/immigrant-detention-hunger-strike/
[https://perma.cc/HN22-8J4R].
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Yet, the expansion of the mass detention system likely comes as
welcome news to the many American companies that profit from it. The
chief executives of the private companies running these immigration facilities “speak of ‘improved occupancy rates’ as a perverse benefit of
[ICE’s] practices, which heavily sweep in undocumented immigrants as
‘detainees.’” 26 DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council reported in
2016 that 65 percent of the detainee population resides in private facilities, while 25 percent are detained in public facilities like county jails, and
only 10 percent of detainees reside in federally owned and directed facilities. 27 According to data compiled by the Urban Justice Center’s Correc-

23. Associated Press, More than 5,400 Children Split at Border, According to New Count,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
more-5-400-children-split-border-according-new-count-n1071791
[https://perma.cc/X3H8-Z4VW] (reporting that 5,400 children separated from their parents at the border, especially the 1,500 admitted between July 2017 to June 2018, were
“difficult to find because the government had inadequate tracking systems); Jacob
Soboroff, Emails Show Trump Admin Had ‘No Way to Link’ Separated Migrant Children to
Parents, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2019, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
immigration/emails-show-trump-admin-had-no-way-link-separated-migrant-n1000746
[https://perma.cc/5A64-PJGG] (citing delays in family reunifications because government’s allegedly centralized database system “did not contain enough information to successfully reunite parents and kids”).
24. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Scheduled Approved, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES:
RECORDS EXPRESS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://records-express.blogs.archives.gov/2019
/12/17/immigration-and-customs-enforcement-scheduled-approved/ [https://perma.cc
/95RU-JCPK] (noting the cache of documents scheduled for destruction included “covers records related to deaths of detainees and allegations of sexual assault and abuse of
detainees”).
25. Eunice Cho, The Trump Administration Weakens Standards for ICE Detention Facilities, ACLU (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/the-trumpadministration-weakens-standards-for-ice-detention-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/E2YVM3LM] (explaining how new standards weaken protections for immigrants by removing
critical requirements governing health accreditation, health assessments, and physician supervision; eliminating protections against the use of force and solitary confinement; eradicating standards governing basic needs and human dignity, such that “ICE no longer requires that hold rooms have toilets with modesty panels, and removes the ratios for the
number of toilets per detainee”; and modifying the requirements for new facilities to no
longer require outdoor recreation space).
26. Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass
Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 970 (2019).
27. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://immigrant
justice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/press-release/documents/2016-12/
DHS_HSAC_PIDF_Report-FINAL_DRAFT.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FBC-W5FF]; see
also Mike Ludwig, Big Banks Are Divesting From Private Prisons, Thanks to Anti-ICE Activism, SLUDGE (July 24, 2019, 11:44 AM), https://readsludge.com/2019/07/24/big-banksare-divesting-from-private-prisons-thanks-to-anti-ice-activism/ [https://perma.cc/N8L3RWGN] (reporting that the National Immigrant Justice Center estimates that “71 percent
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tions Accountability Project in 2019, as many as 72 percent of immigrant
detainees are held in privately owned facilities. 28 As a result, “ICE spends
more than $2 billion a year on immigrant detention through private
jails.” 29 The two largest detention companies—GEO Group and CoreCivic, formerly Corrections Corporation of America—earned a combined $985 million from contracts with ICE in 2017. 30
This business is only expanding, as are the earnings. The staggering
increase in immigration detention, both in terms of total numbers and
length of confinement, perpetuates the “profit-driven incentivization for
mass incarceration of immigrants.”31 These companies are planning and
constructing additional detention facilities 32 while detained individuals
and advocacy groups continue to make allegations regarding the poor
quality of care in these facilities. 33
Privatization also shields operators from scrutiny because “detention
contractors are not subject to federal open records laws, civil service requirements, administrative law, constitutional requirements, and other
legal checks that would otherwise apply to federal officials doing the same
work.” 34 ICE is responsible for monitoring private facilities to ensure that
they meet detention standards. The Inspector General of the Department

of people in ICE custody were held at private facilities in 2017” as opposed to “only 8.5
percent of state and federal prisoners are held in private jails and prisons”).
28. Immigration Detention: An American Business, WORTH RISES, [hereinafter Worth
Rises] https://worthrises.org/immigration [https://perma.cc/GP8A-L9AY] (last visited
Sept. 26, 2020).
29. John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21, 2017, 5:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private-immigrantjails-boom [https://perma.cc/TX5A-7UHK].
30. Worth Rises, supra note 28.
31. Tanvi Misra, Emails Show How Private Firms Profit from ICE Detention Centers, ROLL
CALL (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:09 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/emails-showhow-private-firms-profit-from-ice-detention-centers
[https://perma.cc/G36U-FCPH]
(reporting that Immigration Centers of America was awaiting payment “for at least $1.8
million in February for running operations at the Farmville facility, which has around 700
beds” and “that ICE pays $120 per day for each person held at Farmville, and an additional $28 per person when the total number of detainees exceeds 500”).
32. Nuria Marquez Martinez, ICE Is Rushing to Open For-Profit Detention Centers—
Right Before California’s Ban Goes Into Effect, Mother Jones (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/10/ice-california-new-detention-facilitiesprivate-profit/ [https://perma.cc/U4DT-48RA].
33. See Gaby Del Valle, ICE Has Been Ramping Up Its Work with a Private Prison
Company Connected to Horrific Allegations, VICE (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:31 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ywa4v5/ice-has-been-ramping-up-its-work-witha-private-prison-company-connected-to-horrific-allegations [https://perma.cc/6ZUDDWVU].
34. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration
Federalism, 71 STAN. L. REV. Online 224, 226 (2019).
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of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reported that ICE has failed to “ensure
adequate oversight” for these facilities, leaving some issues “unaddressed
for years.” 35 When coupled with destructive public commentary that dehumanizes the individuals who are detained, these circumstances are likely to worsen detention conditions and result in further constitutional violations. 36
B. The Civil-Criminal Distinction
There are many similarities between the immigration and criminal
detention settings, including poor conditions, gross lack of oversight, and
systemic underfunding of detainee services. 37 However, the most salient
parallels are the staggering racial disparities within these systems and the

35. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ICE’S INSPECTIONS AND
MONITORING OF DETENTION FACILITIES DO NOT LEAD TO SUSTAINED COMPLIANCE
OR SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENTS (June 26, 2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/assets/2018-06/OIG-18-67-Jun18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET5L-5PFP].
36. See John Fritze, Trump Used Words Like ‘Invasion’ and ‘Killer’ to Discuss Immigrants at
Rallies 500 Times, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trump-immigrants-rhetoric-criticized-el-pasodayton-shootings/1936742001/ [https://perma.cc/5MFJ-YVPE] (documenting that an
“analysis of the 64 rallies Trump has held since 2017 found that, when discussing immigration, the president has said ‘invasion’ at least 19 times. He has used the word ‘animal’
34 times and the word ‘killer’ nearly three dozen times”); see also Tess Bonn, Trump’s Immigration Rhetoric Has ‘Chilling Effect’ on Families, Says Children’s Advocacy Group Director,
HILL (Dec. 20, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/422371-childrens-advocacygroup-director-says-trumps-immigration-rhetoric-has-chilling [https://perma.cc/D9WAUVDP]; see also Philip Rucker, ‘How Do You Stop These People?’: Trump’s
Anti-immigrant Rhetoric Looms over El Paso Massacre, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-do-you-stop-these-people-trumps-antiimmigrant-rhetoric-looms-over-el-paso-massacre/2019/08/04/62d0435a-b6ce-11e9a091-6a96e67d9cce_story.html.
37. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, As #DefundThePolice Movement Gains
Steam, Immigration Enforcement Spending and Practices Attract Scrutiny, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (June 25, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/defundthepolicemovement-gains-steam-immigration-enforcement-spending-and-practices-attract
[https://perma.cc/46NB-XVRE]; Stacy Brustin, I Toured an Immigration Detention Center.
The Prison-like Atmosphere Was Mind-numbing., USA TODAY (May 16, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2019/05/16/ice-immigrationdetention-center-like-prison-otero-column/1190633001/
[https://perma.cc/NMB2SYLW]; Claire Brown, ICE Detainees Are Supposed to Get Three Square Meals a Day—But
They Don’t, FOOD JUSTICE (Aug. 24, 2018), https://civileats.com/2018/08/24/icedetainees-are-supposed-to-get-three-square-meals-a-day-but-they-dont/
[https://perma.cc/6FZR-LEMS]; John W. Schoen & Chloe Aiello, ICE Overspends Tax
Dollars on a Detention Policy Many Americans Find Abhorrent, CNBC (June 22, 2018, 12:04
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/22/ice-overspends-tax-dollars-on-a-detentionpolicy-many-americans-find-abhorrent.html [https://perma.cc/P9A8-MWUL].
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increasing trend toward privatization. Despite the many commonalities,
the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment is determined by one vital
difference between these detention contexts.
Like the immigrant detention system, the prison population is “disproportionately men and women of color.” 38 People of color are
overrepresented in detention 39 for several reasons, including the criminalization of poverty, 40 the over-policing of communities of color, 41 and the
historical vestiges of discrimination that have become institutionalized in
our criminal legal system. 42 This has given rise to “a prison system that
incarcerates black people at more than five times the rate of white people.” 43

38. Goodwin, supra note 26, at 971.
39. Compare Inmate Race, U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp [https://perma.cc/PK59-3MBZ] (last visited Apr. 5,
2020) (providing statistics on incarceration rates), with Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/3ZJ3AEXW] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (despite comprising only 13.4 percent of the population, Black people represent 37.5 percent of those detained in federal prisons; Native
Americans are also overrepresented, constituting 2.3 percent of detained individuals but
only 1.3 percent of the general population; data on Hispanic/Latinos not provided).
40. Jeff Yungman, The Criminalization of Poverty, AM. BAR ASS’N (2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2019/januaryfebruary/criminalization-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/Y9NB-C92D] (finding that “[p]oor
people, especially people of color, face a greater risk of being fined, arrested, and even
incarcerated for minor offenses . . . [such as] [a] broken taillight, an unpaid parking ticket,
a minor drug offense, sitting on a sidewalk, or sleeping in a park”) (referencing KAREN
DOLAN, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY).
41. See, e.g., Alexi Jones, Police Stops Are Still Marred by Racial Discrimination, New Data
Shows, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/
2018/10/12/policing/ [https://perma.cc/VHJ7-SBS3] (noting “Black residents were
more likely to be stopped by police than white or Hispanic residents, both in traffic stops
and street stops” and that “[p]olice are twice as likely to use force against people of color”); Danyelle Solomon, The Intersection of Policing and Race, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Sept. 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2016/
09/01/143357/the-intersection-of-policing-and-race/ [https://perma.cc/229T-UMFZ];
Shaun King, Communities of Color are Massively Over-policed — Effectively Criminalizing Color Itself, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2016, 4:37 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/communities-color-massively-over-policed-article-1.2741945
[https://perma.cc/5NW5-98WF].
42. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2011).
43. Becky Little, Does an Exception Clause in the 13th Amendment Still Permit Slavery?,
HISTORY.COM (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/13th-amendmentslavery-loophole-jim-crow-prisons [https://perma.cc/CC8V-S2AY]; see also Criminal
Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/
[https://perma.cc/3ALC-LESZ] (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
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The second notable similarity to the immigration detention context
is the rapid increase of the privatization of prisons, especially since the
start of “the Trump Administration, [when] private prison companies
have expanded their reach and consolidated their market share.” 44 The
U.S. Department of Justice has acknowledged that “between 1980 and
2013, the federal prison population increased by almost 800 percent,”
such that private prisons have profited from this expansion.45
As a result of these trends, laborers in prison are predominantly
people of color and are increasingly under the control of private companies that run these detention facilities. However, the Thirteenth
Amendment exempts “punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted” from its scope of protection. 46 Accordingly,
“prison labor practices, from chain gangs to prison laundries, do not run
afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment.” 47 Those confined within the jail or
prison system pursuant to a criminal conviction are part of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s loophole. 48 These individuals’ labor is either unpaid or underpaid. 49 This has been permitted for years, despite arguments advocat-

44. Goodwin, supra note 26, at 970 (citing Ciara O’Neill, Private Prisons: Principally
Profit-Oriented and Politically Pliable, FOLLOW THE MONEY (June 7, 2018),
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/private-prisons-principallyprofit-oriented-and-politically-pliable [https://perma.cc/B9MW-3QM3]).
45. Id. at 971 (citing Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney General, on
Reducing Our Use of Private Prisons (Aug. 18. 2016), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/opa/file/886311/download [https://perma.cc/NTQ9-AZF4]).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; but see James Gray Pope, Mass Incarceration, Convict Leasing, and the Thirteenth Amendment: A Revisionist View, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1465 (July 23,
2019) (Although beyond the scope of this Article, at least one scholar contends that—
notwithstanding the Punishment Clause—convicted persons retain Thirteenth Amendment protection against any slavery or involuntary servitude that has not been inflicted “as
punishment” for the particular crime of which they “have been duly convicted.” If that
argument holds true, then the Amendment shields persons who are incarcerated not only
against compulsory labor, but also against any badge or incident of slavery that has not
been imposed as part of the individual’s sentence.).
47. Jamal Greene & Jennifer Mason McAward, Common Interpretation: The Thirteenth
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution
/interpretation/amendment-xiii/interps/137 [https://perma.cc/SN24-KK58] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2020).
48. Little, supra note 43.
49. Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/
[https://perma.cc/V7AS-EMGU] (noting several states where “regular prison jobs are still
unpaid in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Texas”; reviewing wages for regular,
non-industry jobs: where lowest pay is $0 and highest pay is $2.00, and jobs in stateowned businesses or “correctional industries,” where lowest pay is $0 and highest pay is
$5.15).
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ing for improving the pay of incarcerated laborers. Ultimately, those
who are criminally detained are exempt from the Thirteenth Amendment and subject to a form of modern-day slavery.51
By contrast, immigration detention is civil in nature. 52 Although
some immigration offenses such as unlawful re-entry are criminal offenses
with criminal penalties, many immigration violations are civil in nature.53
Federal law recognizes this civil-criminal distinction in the immigration
context. For instance, physical presence in the United States without
proper authorization, such as overstaying a visa, is a civil—but not criminal—offense. 54 As such, the civil nature of immigration detention is important to note given the Thirteenth Amendment’s criminal detention
exemption.
Thus, despite the many similarities between the individuals detained
by the criminal legal and the immigration detention systems—including
being subject to complete control in a confined setting within a system
that has a disparate impact on communities of color—the fundamental
distinction between the criminal versus civil nature of the detention impacts the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections. As a

50. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PRISONER LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE (May 20, 1993), https://www.gao.gov/assets
/220/217999.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRC6-97W7]. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found in 1993 that “inmates are not paid or are paid at rates that are
substantially less than the federal minimum wage,” “prison systems would have a substantial increase in costs if they were required to pay inmate workers the minimum wage,”
and that “some organizations generally favored improving inmate work programs and inmate pay through greater use of prison industry programs, and believed that prison industries gain an unfair competitive advantage by not paying inmates minimum wages.” Id. at
4, 6, 10.
51. See Lindsey Bever & Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Inmates Across the U.S. Are Staging a
Prison Strike over ‘Modern-day Slavery’, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2018, 5:53 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/08/21/inmates-across-us-are-stagingprison-strike-over-modern-day-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/FDW9-6R5P]; see also Jennifer Safstrom & Claire G. Gastañaga, Virginia Must Stop Exploiting People in Prison,
Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/local-opinions
/virginia-must-stop-exploiting-people-in-prison/2020/04/23/e6516ff8-790e-11ea-b6ff597f170df8f8_story.html.
52. Sullivan & Mason, supra note 17 (“Immigration detention is the practice of holding
individuals in government custody for immigration violations, such as illegal entry or visa
overstay, during their removal proceedings. Notably, to remain in the United States
without authorization is an administrative violation of the law. For this reason, immigration detention is civil in nature and therefore distinct from criminal incarceration.”).
53. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
54. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213
(2018) (Kagan, J., plurality opinion) (holding, in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1227, that
“[t]he removal of an alien is a civil matter”); Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (agreeing about the civil context).
THE
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result, though in many ways similarly situated in terms of confinement
and vulnerability, those in the immigration detention are entitled to protections against forced labor that individuals who are incarcerated do not
receive. 55
C. History and Legal Context of the Thirteenth Amendment and
Trafficking Victims Protection Act
While the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery upon its ratification in 1865, the Amendment continues to serve an important function
in preventing labor abuses. 56 The Amendment declares that “[n]either
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction,” 57 and “is enforceable against
private parties in the absence of state action.” 58 Its expansiveness is neither
limited in its geographic reach nor in who is required to comply with the
prohibition; it is an unqualified denunciation of the conditions of forced
labor “and not a declaration in favor of a particular people” such that the
Amendment “reaches every race and every individual.” 59 The Thirteenth
Amendment, like most provisions of the Constitution, applies to noncitizens, who are guaranteed “many of the basic rights, such as the freedom of religion and speech, the right to due process and equal protection
under the law” by virtue of their personhood and presence in the United
States, not their citizenship status.60
Moreover, under Section 2, Congress has the “power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.” 61 This provision permits Congress
to legislate against the “badges and incidents of slavery” that violate the
Amendment. 62 The expansive nature of the Thirteenth Amendment and

55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
56. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary Servitude § 12 (2020).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
58. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary Servitude § 12 (2020).
59. Id.
60. Gretchen Frazee, What Constitutional Rights Do Undocumented Immigrants Have?,
PBS (June 25, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/
what-constitutional-rights-do-undocumented-immigrants-have [https://perma.cc/DC64H8WV].
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
62. Greene & McAward, supra note 47 (providing examples of congressional legislation: “the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 prohibits peonage, and another federal law, 18
U.S.C. § 1592, makes it a crime to take somebody’s passport or other official documents
for the purpose of holding her as a slave”; “Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 (which criminalizes race-based hate crimes) and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (which penalizes human trafficking and protects its survivors).”).
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the laws pursuant to Section 2 “are grounded in the view that slavery was
not just the holding of black Americans to unpaid service, but an entire
system of social relations designed to enforce a racial hierarchy . . . [and
that] [t]hese practices denied the equal citizenship status, and implicitly
the humanity, of African Americans.”63 Thus, it is no surprise that the
Thirteenth Amendment ban on slavery and involuntary servitude encompasses “a broad[] range of labor arrangements where a person is
forced to work by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.” 64 This includes not only situations in which a “servant believes that
he or she has no viable alternative but to perform service for the master
because of the master’s use or threatened use of physical force, such as
where there is repeated use and threats to use physical force,” but also
those means where “the law, legal process, or legal institutions [are used]
to compel service.” 65
II. Litigation in the Immigration Detention Context
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution—the Reconstruction Amendments—are animated by twin
purposes: inclusion and equality. These amendments—banning slavery,
extending citizenship, and safeguarding voting—were ratified in the wake
of the Civil War in an effort to establish equality for Black Americans
with the goal of ensuring full societal participation and political representation. “The Reconstruction Amendments were the first to include separate, express authorization for Congress to enforce their substantive
commands” and “were the first amendments to the U.S. Constitution to
enlarge federal power.” 66
The Thirteenth Amendment has been applied in the modern context against forced labor practices. Pursuant to its authority under Section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1589 as
part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act to broaden the definition
of the types of coercion that could intimidate or pressure an individual
63. Jamal Greene, Matters of Debate: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Constitutional
Imagination, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/
interpretation/amendment-xiii/interps/137#the-thirteenth-amendment-today-jamalgreene [https://perma.cc/TB62-25HA] (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
64. Greene & McAward, supra note 47 (noting that “the Thirteenth Amendment bans
peonage, which occurs when a person is compelled to work to pay off a debt” and that
would trap individuals “in a cycle of work-without-pay” that the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)).
65. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary Servitude § 6 (citing U.S. v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th
Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995)).
66. Christopher Bryant, The Pursuit of Perfection: Congressional Power to Enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 579, 596 (2010).
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into forced labor. This expanded definition developed “in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931
(1988), which interpreted § 1584 to require the use or threatened use of
physical or legal coercion,” encompasses types of conduct that might result in forced labor.67 Section 1589 prohibits:
[O]btain[ing] labor or services . . .
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or
threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that
person or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal
process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause
the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such
labor or services, that person or another person would suffer
serious harm or physical restraint.68
Those who violate the § 1589 forced labor provision “shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”69
Code provision 18 U.S.C.A. § 1595 provides a civil cause of action
for enforcement of any violation of this chapter, including § 1589. This
subjects any individual who perpetrates a violation or who “knowingly
benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged
in an act in violation of this chapter” to liability “in an appropriate district court of the United States” for “damages and reasonable attorneys
fees.” 70
Advocates have filed lawsuits to remedy forced labor violations occurring in the immigration detention context pursuant to this provision.71

67. Involuntary Servitude, Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking Statutes Enforced, U.S. DEP’T
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/involuntary-servitude-forced-labor-and-sextrafficking-statutes-enforced [https://perma.cc/5BGS-RWGG] (last updated Aug. 6,
2015).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1595.
71. See, e.g., Laura D. Francis, $1-a-Day Work Program for Immigrant Detainees Heads to
Trial, BLOOMBERG LAW: DAILY LABOR REPORT (Aug. 7, 2019, 5:12 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/geo-group-must-face-lawsuit-over1-a-day-immigrant-detainee-pay [https://perma.cc/7DG5-AYWA]; Tess Owen, Detained Immigrants Suing a Private Prison Company over Forced Labor Move Forward with
Groundbreaking Class Action, VICE (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:18 AM), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/paz5qb/detained-immigrants-suing-a-private-prison-company-over-forcedlabor-move-forward-with-groundbreaking-class-action [https://perma.cc/JK2C-3G7M].
OF
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Some courts have found § 1589 to be a constitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad enforcement power and command to enact “appropriate legislation,” while others have held this implicitly in applying the statute. 72 This section
compares the analysis and reasoning relied upon by various courts in assessing arguments pursuant to § 1589 as a mechanism for implementing
the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise against slavery and indentured servitude, including its modern manifestation in the immigration context.73
A. Textual Analysis
In Menocal v. GEO Group, plaintiffs Alejandro Menocal, Marcos
Brambila, Grisel Xahuentitla, Hugo Hernandez, Lourdes Argueta, Jesus
Gaytan, Olga Alexaklina, Dagoberto Vizguerra, and Demetrio Valerga
filed a class claim on behalf of current and former detainees of the Aurora
Detention Facility, a private immigration detention center owned and
operated by the GEO Group, Inc. 74 In this suit, detainees challenged
both GEO’s “Housing Unit Sanitation Policy, which required all detainees to clean their common living areas[,] and the Voluntary Work Program, which compensated detainees $1 a day for performing various
jobs.” 75 Under the sanitation policy’s “disciplinary system, detainees who
refused to perform their cleaning assignments faced a range of possible
sanctions, including: (1) the initiation of criminal proceedings, (2) disciplinary segregation—or solitary confinement—up to 72 hours, (3) loss of
commissary, (4) loss of job, (5) restriction to housing unit, (6) reprimand,
or (7) warning.” 76
Complainants asserted they were “forced . . . to clean the [housing
units] for no pay and under threat of solitary confinement as punishment
for any refusal to work.” 77 Those participating in the Voluntary Work
Program allege they worked up to eight hours a day “serving food, cleaning the facilities, doing laundry, and stripping and waxing floors” for only
$1 in compensation.78

72. United States v. Garcia, No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 WL 22938040, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010) (finding
error in the applied standard of review, but raising no issues regarding 1589’s underlying
legitimacy or Congress’ authority to enact such a provision).
73. This Article does not address the retroactivity of TVPA’s provisions.
74. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo. 2017).
75. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 910-11 (10th Cir. 2018).
76. Id. at 911.
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
78. Id.
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The Menocal plaintiffs’ argument rests on the plain text of the
TVPA, which prohibits “knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor
or services of a person by . . . means of force, threats of force, physical
restraint, or threats of physical restrain.”79 The threat or means of force
“reaches any type of forced labor.”80 In response, GEO cited U.S. v.
Kozminski, a 1988 Supreme Court case that held “§ 1584 reaches only
compulsion of services by use of physical or legal, as opposed to psychological, coercion.” 81 GEO also relied on Channer v. Hall, a case from the
Fifth Circuit, which “held that an immigration detainee forced to work
in the kitchen under threat of solitary confinement was not subjected to
involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.” 82 Although the language at issue in Kozminski and Channer appear in the same
title, the court held the “language at issue here [in § 1589] is thus broader . . . and intentionally so.” 83 The text of § 1589 of the TVPA, passed in
its current iteration in 2008, was not constrained by the text or prior interpretations of different language reflected in § 1584, as the defendant
detention center suggested. Moreover, the court determined that the legislative history of the provisions required a reading consistent with those
put forth by Menocal and the other then-putative class representatives.84
Thus, the court refused to dismiss the claim.85
The plaintiffs and the court in Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc. relied on the
same textual argument in Menocal. Plaintiffs Sylvester Owino and Jonathan Gomez were incarcerated at the Otay Mesa Detention Center facility where “they and other detainees performed a variety of tasks for Defendant ranging from scrubb[ing] bathrooms, showers, toilets, and
windows to provid[ing] barber services to detainees to perform[ing] clerical work for CoreCivic” for $1 a day. 86 In Owino, “Plaintiffs respond[ed]
that the plain text of the TVPA, including section 1589, proscribes any
kind of forced labor even if that labor does not rise to the level of involuntary servitude as defined prior to enactment of the TVPA . . . [because]
the plain meaning of the TVPA is broad enough to encompass their
claims.” 87 The court in Owino found that the statutory language is unam-

79. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (D. Colo. 2015).
80. Id. (citing Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 790 F.Supp.2d
1134 (C.D. Cal. 2011) and U.S. v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008)).
81. Id. (citing U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 93 (1988)).
82. Id. (citing Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir.1997)).
83. Id. at 1133.
84. See infra Part III.B.
85. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1133 (D. Colo. 2015).
86. Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at *1
(S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at *4.
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biguous because “[t]he statute’s express terms do not limit who constitutes a victim of forced labor” and the provision “applies to any ‘person’—there is no limitation on the type or status of said person.” 88 However, the defendant asserted that they were not subject to the forced labor
provision because there were no “trafficking” violations under the
TVPA. The court dismissed this argument, finding that “the statute [does
not] contain any language limiting application to those who traffic in persons or transport persons across national borders.” 89 The Owino court also
acknowledged that the term “labor or services” was left undefined by the
statute and, relying on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
found the term’s ordinary meaning to include any “expenditure of physical or mental effort esp[ecially] when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory”
or “the performance of work commanded or paid for by another.” 90 As
such, the allegations that “detainees cleaned, maintained, scrubbed,
swept, and mopped floors, bathrooms, showers, toilets, and windows . . .
are clearly within the definition of labor or service.” 91 The court also
acknowledged that threats of solitary confinement, the harm alleged by
plaintiffs, was sufficient because “solitary confinement bears ‘a further terror and peculiar mark of infamy’” that even “the threat of solitary confinement, sufficiently alleges the means to achieve forced labor.” 92
The Owino case guided the development of Gonzalez v. CoreCivic,
Inc., a related matter in which plaintiffs Carlos Gonzalez, Juan Jose Merino-Rodas, Maribel Gutierrez-Canchola, Gladys Carrera-Duarte, and
Jennye Pagoada-Lopez (“Gonzalez Plaintiffs”) sought to consolidate their
case with Owino’s. 93 These plaintiffs, like the complainants in Owino, “are
former civil immigration detainees housed at Defendant’s Otay Mesa facility . . . [who] allege[d] that they received $1 or $1.50 a day for their
labor at the detention facility” under threat of solitary confinement or
loss of privileges.94 The court denied the motion to consolidate and
stayed the Gonzalez case “until it rules on class certification (or other dispositive motions, such as a motion to dismiss with prejudice) in Owino.” 95
In another case, plaintiffs Wilhen Barrientos, Margarito VelazquezGalicia, and Shoaib Ahmed sued CoreCivic for “forc[ing] detainees to
work through threats of physical violence, solitary confinement, and dep-

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *10.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *11.
93. Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-2573 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 1621543, at
*1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018).
94. Id. at *1, *3.
95. Id. at *6.
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rivation of basic necessities” at the Stewart Detention Center in Georgia. 96 In August 2018, Barrientos and the other class members survived a
motion to dismiss. 97 The district court in Georgia was not swayed by
CoreCivic’s argument that the “TVPA is intended to apply narrowly to
forced labor in the human trafficking context” and that applying the
TVPA “to detainee work programs is ‘absurd’ and contrary to the intentions of Congress.” 98 The court found such an interpretation “ignores the
plain language of the statute” and “misunderstands ‘the absurdity doctrine,’ which is a narrow exception to the fundamental principle that
statutory interpretation must be anchored to the plain language of the
statute.” 99 Consistent with the reasoning of other courts, the Barrientos
court held that the plain reading of § 1589 indicates that “Congress
placed no such restriction in the statute but chose instead to broadly prohibit ‘whoever’ from ‘obtain[ing] labor’ by any of the proscribed
means.” 100 Thus, while the “lawful force necessary to detain the detainees
cannot be the source for the TVPA claims,” individuals “cannot be
forced into labor in violation of the TVPA.”101 The defendant sought to
persevere under the absurdity doctrine, contending that deviation from
the ordinary sense of the words is appropriate because otherwise the purported interpretation “would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance
or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument.”102 The court here readily dismissed the applicability of the absurdity doctrine, noting that this
canon does not provide license for “judicial revision of public and private
texts to make them (in the judge’s view) more reasonable.” 103 Because
“CoreCivic points to no particular word or phrase in the TVPA that it
claims must be corrected” and “relies upon no language in the statute for
this broad assertion,” the court declined to “re-draft” the statute to align
with CoreCivic’s reading simply because the company “may find it absurd that Congress drafted the TVPA in such a way that it theoretically
reaches the conduct alleged here.” 104
The lower court’s denial of defendant CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, allowing the plaintiffs’ case to
proceed, by finding that “the TVPA applies to private for-profit contrac-

96. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1307 (M.D. Ga. 2018).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1310.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1310-11 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 237 (2012)).
104. Id. at 1311.
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tors operating federal immigration detention facilities.” The panel’s
holding, like the district court, found the TVPA’s “clear and unambiguous language . . . limits liability only by reference to the actions taken by
a would-be violator” and “applies to anyone who knowingly obtains the
labor or services of a person through one of the four illegal coercive
means explicitly listed in the statute,” with “[n]o other limiting principle” in the plain text of the statute.106
The federal district court in Texas rejected CoreCivic’s motion to
dismiss a TVPA claim pursuant to § 1589 in Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc.,
arising out of complaints levied by Martha Gonzalez and those similarly
situated at the Laredo Detention Center.107 During her confinement,
“Gonzalez contends that . . . she was paid only $1 or $1.50 per day to
clean pods, work in the kitchen, sort laundry, and perform other duties
under threat of punishment, including but not limited to lockdown and
solitary confinement.” 108 Similar to the claims of other immigrant detainees, Gonzalez alleges that those who refused to work were threatened by
CoreCivic “with confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained
restrictions, deprivation, violation of their liberty, and solitary confinement, including the denial or delay of hygiene products.” 109 As a result,
immigrants at the facility “performed labor for no pay or at a rate of
compensation of $1.00 to $2.00 per day for work performed.”110 Here,
too, the court found that “CoreCivic’s argument fails to identify any ambiguity in the language or exceptional circumstances to depart from the
plain language of the statute” and, given that “[t]here is no ambiguity in
section 1589,” refused to “read congressional findings into the statute.”111
As in Owino, the court here also found “that solitary confinement, or the
threat of solitary confinement, sufficiently alleges the means to achieve
forced labor, and the court therefore concludes that Gonzalez has sufficiently stated a claim for a TVPA violation sufficient to overcome the
motion to dismiss.” 112
Although the Central District of California agreed in Novoa v. GEO
Group that § 1589 applies to immigrant detainees, the court found the allegations lacked specificity to state a plausible pattern/practice claim. The

105. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020).
106. Id. at 1276-77.
107. Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-169-LY, 2019 WL 2572540, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2019).
108. Id.; see also supra, note 4 (referencing Complaint at 2-3, Menocal v. GEO Grp.,
Inc.).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
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court recognized that the text and scope of the TVPA applied to the defendants, holding that “[t]he plain language of § 1589 holds no limitation
on who it applies to; indeed, subdivision (a) begins ‘whoever.’”113 The
court heard the case of Raul Novoa, who filed a putative class action on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated detainees. Novoa worked as
a janitor and barber through the Voluntary Work Program over the
course of the three years he was detained at the Adelanto facility. 114 In his
complaint, Novoa alleges that as a janitor he “worked four-hour shifts,
up to seven days per week” and as a barber for “up to ten hours per day,
seven days a week.” 115 Novoa asserted that he spent his earnings on
“food, bottled water, and hygiene products . . . among other necessities”
and was threatened with “solitary confinement if he stopped working or
encouraged other detainees to stop working.”116
Despite these assertions, the court ultimately concluded that “Plaintiff fails to provide more than conclusory assertions in support of his
TVPA claim.” 117 Though Novoa “alleged a scheme involving GEO
withholding necessities for detainees and officer threats of solitary confinement or criminal prosecution for refusing to work, Plaintiff does not
sufficiently substantiate these allegations” because he failed to “describe[]
when he was threatened or who threatened him” or “allege any additional information about the withheld necessities to make his allegations
more than conclusory assertions.” 118 The court acknowledged that a
forced labor claim could be alleged against GEO but held that the facts as
pleaded in the complaint were insufficient to state a plausible claim that a
“policy and uniform practice” of withholding necessities was occurring,
instead granting Novoa leave to amend the complaint. 119 This deviated
from the holding in Owino and other cases, where plaintiffs’ allegations of
“a specific punishment (solitary confinement) carried out or threatened to
be carried out as a direct consequence for refusing to perform labor . . .
while Plaintiffs were under the exclusive control of Defendant” were sufficient to state a claim. 120
In each of these cases, the court of record was able to articulate how
the conduct alleged by immigrant detainees was violative of the plain

113. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514 JGB (SHKx), 2018 WL 3343494,
at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589).
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *14.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *14-15.
120. Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at
*11 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018).
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language of § 1589 of the TVPA. Although the Novoa court did not allow the plaintiff to proceed, it acknowledged the underlying conduct, if
sufficiently pleaded, would have likely given rise to a TVPA violation
under the court’s analysis. In sum, the text of § 1589 has been sufficient
for courts to allow claims to proceed and find that immigrant detainees’
claims satisfy the threshold requirements of this provision.
B. Legislative History
The defendants in these cases put forth three distinct arguments to
assert that TVPA’s legislative history does not support its applicability in
the immigration detention context. These arguments related to: (1) the
appropriate scope of § 1589 in the context of appellate court precedent
interpreting § 1584, (2) the need for trafficking or transnational conduct
pursuant to § 1589, and (3) the applicability of § 1589 outside of the trafficking context. These arguments failed to exonerate private detention
companies from compliance with § 1589 of the TVPA; rather, the legislative history indicated that forced labor in the immigration detention
setting is within the reach of § 1589’s forced labor prohibition.
As referenced above, the defendants in these cases attempted to undermine the expansive reading of § 1589 by relying on U.S. v. Kozminski
and Channer v. Hall as precedent that would cabin the reading of this
TVPA provision. This is because Kozminski and Channer interpreted
§ 1584 to encompass “only compulsion of services by use of physical or
legal, as opposed to psychological, coercion.”121 As the Menocal court noted, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in U.S. v. Kaufman is persuasive. 122 “The
legislative history reveals that, in enacting § 1589, Congress sought to expand Kozminski’s limited definition of coercion under § 1584, stating that
‘[s]ection 1589 will provide federal prosecutors with the tools to combat
severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise to the level of involuntary servitude as defined in Kozminski.’” 123 Thus the plaintiffs here
properly “argue[d] that § 1589 should not be interpreted similarly to
§ 1584 because Congress enacted § 1589 in order to broaden the narrow
definition of coercion adopted by the Supreme Court in Kozminski.” 124
The Southern District of California came to the same conclusion,
holding that “[h]ad Congress intended to limit § 1589 to trafficking or
transnational crime it could have done so; indeed, other sections of the

121. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (D. Colo. 2015) (citing
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)).
122. Id.
123. U.S. v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1261 (10th Cir 2008).
124. Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.
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TVPA contain the limiting language Defendant urges the Court read into
§ 1589.” 125 In support of this assertion, the Owino court referenced
§ 1591’s prohibition against “[s]ex trafficking of children or by force,
fraud, or coercion,” which has “an explicit interstate or foreign commerce requirement.” 126 The court also distinguished § 1584’s restriction
against “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude . . . any other person for any term, or brings within the United States
any person so held.”127 Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he lack of
similar language in section 1589 reinforces the conclusion that there is no
limitation on who constitutes a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1589”
and its applicability under the following circumstances.
Finally, the defendants argued that “the TVPA is inapplicable because its purpose was to prevent human trafficking, and cases exclusively
apply the TVPA to trafficking persons for labor and/or sex.” 128 In quarreling over § 1589, private detention companies argue that “applying the
TVPA here would go beyond the intent and purpose of the statute,
which was to prosecute and deter the trafficking of persons over geographic spaces.” 129 The court in Owino responded by analogizing to United States v. Callahan, a case where “defendants argued that the TVPA’s
legislative history was passed to combat international trafficking in human
beings and Congress did not intend to criminalize their conduct.”130 In
Callahan, the court found that the plain language was not limited to victims who were immigrants or sex workers, and the court could not read
in such a limitation when “the language of the statu[t]e did not include
such a restriction.” 131 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Barrientos “d[id]
not find a private government contractor’s obtaining forced labor
through actual or threatened force, restraint, or serious harm to be so far
removed from the purpose Congress identified as to cause us to look beyond the plain statutory language” and did not “justify a departure from
the principle that [the court] should give general terms their general
meaning.” 132 Thus, despite the fact the congressional findings all focused
on the evils of trafficking in persons, because the “statute merely proscribes knowingly providing or obtaining labor through defined

125. Owino, 2018 WL 2193644 at *4.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a)(2012)).
128. Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.
129. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514 JGB (SHKx), 2018 WL 3343494,
at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018).
130. Owino, 2018 WL 2193644 at *4.
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir. 2015)).
132. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-15081, 2020 WL 964358, at *8 (11th Cir.
Feb. 28, 2020).
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means . . . [t]here is no basis for Defendant’s proposition that a federal
detention center run by a private entity is excluded from the reach of the
TVPA.” 133
The defendants’ attempted reliance on the TVPA’s legislative history failed them in these cases. The arguments attempted to elevate congressional intent over the plain language, but even so, failed to account
for the interpretations of these legislative findings that support the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the applicability of § 1589 to the civil immigration detention setting.
C. Inapplicability of the Civic Duty Exception
The defendants in these cases also argued that the civic exception to
the Thirteenth Amendment supported their claims and permitted immigrant detainees’ labor. This exception, as articulated in Butler v. Perry,
states:
[T]he 13th Amendment declares that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist . . . It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as exceptional, and
certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those
duties which individuals owe to the state, such as services in
the army, militia, on the jury, etc.134
Defendants relied on the judicially-created exception to the Thirteenth Amendment to hold that “the federal government is entitled to
require a communal contribution by an [immigration] detainee in the
form of housekeeping tasks.” 135 GEO cited to Fifth Circuit precedent in
Channer to argue not only that § 1589 should be interpreted narrowly by
drawing upon § 1584, but that the civic duty exception applied to § 1589
as it did to the other provision within the chapter.136 However, as the
court in Menocal found, “Defendants have cited no authority for reading a
civic duty exception into § 1589, or for applying such an exception to a
private, for-profit corporation under contract with the government.”137 In

133.
134.
135.
inal).
136.
137.

Novoa, 2018 WL 3343494 at *12.
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916).
Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 912 (10th Cir. 2018) (brackets in origId.
Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1133.
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Menocal the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 138
It is antithetical to apply the civic duty exception to non-citizens.
Requiring individuals who are being detained in preparation for possible
removal “from the country precisely because they are not citizens . . . to
perform the duties of citizenship without reaping its most fundamental
benefits” is inapposite.139 The courts’ analysis of the applicability of the
civic duty exception was correct for two main reasons.
First, the private corporate defendants impermissibly argued for the
civic duty to apply, as it is a defense that only the government can invoke
and does “not apply to a contractor such as CoreCivic” or GEO. 140 This
reasoning was acknowledged by the Novoa court, which held that cases
where the civic duty exception was recognized “had a direct government
nexus—government service or work at government-run facilities.” 141 Because CoreCivic was unable to cite “any authority that the civic duty exception can apply to a privately run facility or an instance where a court
did so,” and given that “a private entity contracting with the federal government is not necessarily a federal agent,” the court held the civic duty
exception was inapplicable. 142 The Owino court came to the same conclusion in deciding that the defendant could not avail itself of the “civic duty exception to the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary
servitude whereby state or federal governments could compel their citizens, by threat of criminal sanction, to perform certain civic duties.”143
Citing Menocal, the court reiterated that defendants failed to put forth any
authority that would allow the court to “read a civic duty exception into
§ 1589, or . . . apply[] such an exception to a private, for-profit corporation under contract with the government.”144
Second, even if these corporate entities qualified as government
agents such that they would qualify for the civic duty exception, the exception would not apply in these circumstances. The allegations of forced

138. Ruben J. Garcia, The Thirteenth Amendment and Minimum Wage Laws, 19 NEV. L.J.
479, 499 (2018).
139. Abigail Kerfoot, Reproducing Immigration Detention (2020) (unpublished comment) (on file with author).
140. Garcia, supra note 138 at 498.
141. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514 JGB (SHKx), 2018 WL 3343494,
at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018).
142. Id. (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 126 (2012) as “specifically reject[ing]
the proposition that a private prison-management firm is a federal agent like a federal employee”).
143. Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at
*6-10 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018).
144. Id. at *8 (citing Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1133 (D. Colo. 2015).
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labor in these cases extend far beyond the situations where a civic duty
has been recognized, such as jury duty and military conscription.145 Labor
in the immigration detention context is not insulated by the civic duty
exception, which distinguishes those “duties which individuals owe to
the state from the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibitions.” 146 Applying
this exception would also ignore the facial claims asserted by the complainants. As the Novoa court reasoned:
“[e]ven assuming the civic duty exception applies, Plaintiff has
alleged he was a barber, which appears to exceed the housekeeping responsibilities a detainee may be required to perform. Moreover, what duties and tasks the detainees were
compelled to undertake and whether these assignments
amounted to more than general housekeeping tasks are factual
issues.” 147
Accordingly, it would twist the civic duty exception past the point
of recognition if this conduct, especially when undertaken by private actors, was found to be protected under this exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment.
D. Appropriateness of Class Certification
The ability to file a TVPA claim as a class action suit could benefit
the prospective plaintiffs, impact the scope of relief, and materially impact
litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth the threshold requirements for a class action lawsuit and entails a showing that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. 148
These class certification requirements—referred to as the requirements for numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, respective-

145.
146.
147.
148.

Novoa, 2018 WL 3343494 at *13.
Id.
Id. at *12-14.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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ly—ensure that the class claims can move forward. Additionally, under
Rule 23(b)(3) a class action must satisfy two additional requirements:
“questions of law or fact common to class members [must] predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members” and a class action
must be “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 150 Referred to as the predominance and superiority requirements, these additional criteria provide the final hurdle
for claimants seeking class certification.151
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the holding of the district court in
Menocal, conducted a thorough analysis of class certification pursuant to
Rule 23. 152 Although GEO only challenged the commonality and typicality requirements, the court did not limit its analysis to those contested
grounds. 153 The court found the commonality requirement was satisfied
because there were common questions of law and fact, including “(1)
whether the Sanitation Policy constitutes improper means of coercion
under § 1589, (2) whether GEO knowingly obtain[s] detainees’ labor using [the Sanitation Policy], and (3) whether a civic duty exception exempts the Sanitation Policy from § 1589.” 154 As such, the class
“[r]epresentatives have demonstrated the existence of common questions
that can resolve issues central to the validity of its TVPA claim in one
stroke.” 155 The typicality requirement was satisfied because the class asserted “that GEO knowingly obtained class members’ labor by means of
the Sanitation Policy, which threatened—or was intended to cause them
to believe they would suffer—serious harm or physical restraint if they
did not fulfill their cleaning assignments.” 156 The class met the superiority
requirement because individual “class members would have to overcome
significant hurdles to adjudicate their individual claims,” would “have little interest[ ] in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions,” and “the putative class members reside in countries

149. Id.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
151. Id.
152. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 914 (10th Cir. 2018) (analyzing FED.
R. CIV. P. 23).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 916 (internal quotations omitted).
155. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 265 (D. Colo. 2017) (citing WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
156. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 917 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Menocal
v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 264 (D. Colo. 2017) (distinguishing Wal-Mart v.
Dukes because “GEO has a specific, uniformly applicable Sanitation Policy that is the subject of Representatives’ TVPA claim” and that “[t]his Policy is the glue that holds the
allegations of the Representatives and putative class members together, creating a number
of crucial questions with common answers”).
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around the world, lack English proficiency, and have little knowledge of
the legal system in the United States.” 157 Finally, the class also survived
Rule 23’s predominance requirement because “(i) the causation element
is susceptible to generalized proof and thus cannot defeat class certification, and (ii) individual damages assessments would not predominate over
the class’s common issues.” 158
Under this analysis, class certification was appropriate in these circumstances as the best means to vindicate the rights of the complainants
and ensure judicial economy. This strategy also allowed the litigants to
benefit from collective action, including the synergy of resources, to
achieve success on the merits while promoting judicial efficiency. 159
III. Impact of Thirteenth Amendment Forced Labor Litigation
Outside of Court
These litigation efforts across the country have established new
precedent and expanded the context in which the Thirteenth Amendment is applicable. With the unparalleled expansion of immigration detention, these lawsuits are key drivers of reform and should be used to inform and propel other advocacy efforts.
A. Legislative
There are legislative efforts on both the state and national levels that
can complement advocacy in the courts. Currently, twenty-two states do
not house individuals in for-profit prisons. These states, under both
Democratic and Republican control, prohibit private, for-profit facilities.
Additionally, three states—Nevada, Illinois, and California—passed legislation in 2019 to ban for-profit facilities.160 In California alone, this legislation will ultimately close three private prisons and four private detention centers, impacting over 5,400 people currently confined in those

157. Menocal, 882 F.3d at 917 (“GEO also suggests that the class should instead seek to
have the ICE standards relating to the Sanitation Policy ‘changed by the agency, declared
invalid, or enjoined’. . . But such actions, even if feasible, would not provide damages
relief and thus are not ‘superior . . . available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,’ especially for former detainees in the TVPA class.”).
158. Id. at 918.
159. Monique I. Madan, ICE Opposes Class-Action Suit, Says It Would Rather Litigate
1,200 Lawsuits Instead, MIA. HERALD (May 15, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://www.miami
herald.com/news/local/immigration/article242739646.html.
160. Catherine Kim, Private Prisons Face an Uncertain Future as States Turn Their Backs on
the Industry, VOX (Dec. 1, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2019/12/1/20989336/private-prisons-states-bans-califonia-nevada-colorado.
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facilities. Some of these laws have faced significant public criticism and
legal challenges. Recent legislation has faced opposition from some advocates for not being sufficiently progressive and robust, while simultaneously facing resistance from prison companies for being overly stringent.
For example, California’s law has been criticized as insufficiently
robust. Advocates fear that loopholes in the California law will allow private facilities to continue operating under the legislation’s broad carveouts. 162 Specifically, AB 32 does not apply to: (1) “any facility providing
educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate,” (2) facilities that “provide housing for state prison inmates in order
to comply with the requirements of any court-ordered population cap,”
or (3) “any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated” by a law enforcement agency. 163 The danger of these caveats is evident when compared with Nevada’s law, which prohibits “contracts with
any private facilities that provide services like housing and custody after
July 1, 2022, with no exemptions.” 164
In addition to the shortcomings identified by advocates, California’s
law is also being challenged in court by private prison companies who
find the law overly restrictive. GEO Group filed suit in the U.S. Southern District of California alleging AB 32 would unlawfully undermine
enforcement of criminal and immigration law. 165 According to the lawsuit, “GEO has invested more than $300 million in acquiring, constructing and outfitting the facilities it operates” and would stand to “lose more
than $4 billion in capital investment and future revenue over the next 15
years.” 166 Moreover, AB 32 has been challenged by the Trump Admin-

161. Id. (citing Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration
Detention Centers, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-california-prisons/california-bans-private-prisons-and-immigration-detention-centersidUSKBN1WQ2Q9 [https://perma.cc/RS7Q-QLT4].
162. Id.
163. 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 739 (WEST).
164. Kim, supra note 160.
165. Complaint at 1, GEO Grp., Inc. v. Newsom, 2019 WL 7373612 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
(No. 19CV2491); Order, GEO Grp. v. Newsom, Case No.: 19-CV-2491 JLS (WVG),
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2020) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, defendants’ motions to dismiss, and defendants’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings); Associated Press, Geo Group Sues California over AB 32, Which Bans Private Prisons, DESERT SUN (Dec. 31, 2019, 11:06 AM), https://www.desertsun.com/story/
news/2019/12/31/geo-group-sues-california-over-ab-32-ban-private-prisons/
2784752001/ [https://perma.cc/2LBT-EC8U].
166. Rebecca Plevin, 4 Things We Learned from GEO Group’s Lawsuit over Immigration
Detention in California, PALM SPRINGS DESERT SUN (Jan. 2, 2020, 5:49 PM),
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2020/01/02/4-things-we-learned-geo-groupslawsuit-over-immigration-detention-california/2798568001/ [https://perma.cc/Z5PWDRCF].
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istration in separate litigation filed by the Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, and other federal officials.
This lawsuit claims “that AB 32 violates the supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution if applied against the federal government, contending that
federal agencies have the power to decide how they [wi]ll house prisoners and detainees without interference from state governments.” 167 Although the outcome of this litigation is uncertain, efforts to curtail millions of dollars in contracts to these facilities pose a threat to the
operations and financing of these companies.
Legislative changes adopted by states, if implemented at the federal
level, would also be significant in curtailing incentives for private prison
facilities in the immigration context. Yet, part of the challenge of passing
legislative reform on either the federal or state level is the strong foothold
that private detention companies already have in the lobbying sphere. It
is estimated that “GEO Group and CoreCivic have spent $25M[illion]
on lobbying over the past three decades” to increase the number of people incarcerated within their facilities. 168 They have also spent “$10 million in support of their preferred candidates.”169 Both entities have partnered with coalitions like the conservative American Legislative
Exchange Council (“ALEC”), well known for writing and promoting
model legislation focused on mandatory minimum sentences, threestrikes laws, and ‘truth in sentencing’ legislation,” all of which have the
effect of keeping more individuals in detention for longer periods of
time. 170 These companies have also joined to form The Day 1 Alliance,
“to rebut a growing backlash from Democratic presidential candidates
and other industry critics.” 171 The Center for American Progress reported
that “[i]n memos to their shareholders, both companies [—GEO Group
167. Liam Dillon, Trump Administration Sues California over Private Prison Ban, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-25/trumpadministration-sues-california-over-private-prison-ban [https://perma.cc/7R73-859P].
168. Morgan Simon, GEO Group Running Out of Banks as 100% of Known Banking Partners Say ‘No’ to the Private Prison Sector, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2019, 7:33 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/09/30/geo-group-runs-out-ofbanks-as-100-of-banking-partners-say-no-to-the-private-prison-sector/#5275f3b83298
[https://perma.cc/5WBL-KQ89].
169. How to Divest from Immigrant Detention: A Philanthropic Primer, GRANTMAKERS
CONCERNED WITH IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES (Aug. 2019), https://www.gcir.org/
resources/how-divest-immigrant-detention-philanthropic-primer
[https://perma.cc/6ZK7-XKY8].
170. Simon, supra note 168.
171. Private Prison Firms Form Advocacy Group to Rebut Scrutiny, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct.
25, 2019), https://apnews.com/042884c81ec94faeb344a0b4a2fcecd7 [https://perma.cc
/Q69W-8W26] (“Tennessee-based CoreCivic will provide the group’s initial funding”
and “Florida-based The GEO Group and Utah-based Management & Training Corporation will join in leadership roles”).
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and CoreCivic—] acknowledge that policies with the potential to reduce
the U.S. detainee population constitute potential risk factors to their
business model.” 172 This lobbying saturation is mirrored on the state level. 173 Thus, while legislative reform would provide an important vehicle
for reform, the extensive lobbying apparatus of the immigration detention industrial complex advocates against the interests of those in their
care and custody, much like the private prison industry. 174
B. Business Community
The private sector can also play a role in curtailing for-profit detention. First, as with many successful reform initiatives, a strong corporate
consciousness can help increase public awareness and have a strong positive impact, even in the absence of formal government regulation. Second, consumer activism and responsiveness can help propel businesses to
engage in better corporate conduct by demanding transparency and action through their spending and investments. Both of these are uniquely
important. Because of the specific corporate and funding structure of
most private facilities, for-profit detention companies are dependent on
private-sector financing. Accordingly, divestment from these institutions
can help reinforce or supplement litigation efforts to combat forced labor
practices.
It is estimated that “3,100 companies have a financial stake in mass
incarceration, from private healthcare providers and food service operators to well-known names like Amazon and General Electric.”175 However, limiting the financial resources of these for-profit detention companies is an important tool in curtailing their unchecked power. There is an
important role for private businesses to play that may be informed by litigation, legislative work, and community engagement on this issue, and

172. Medha Chidambaram, Big Banks to Stop Future Financing of Prisons & Immigrant Detention Centers, GREEN AM. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.greenamerica.org/blog/bigbanks-stop-financing-prisons-immigrant-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/YCD7MYAR].
173. See Darwin BondGraham, California Bans Private Prisons—Including Ice Detention
Centers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2019/sep/12/california-private-prison-ban-immigration-ice [https://perma.cc/35RVXY96] (“CoreCivic and Geo Group spent $130,000 during the first six months of this
year lobbying the legislature and governor against AB32” in California).
174. See Cynthia Yue, The Private Prison Industrial Complex, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L.
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/thejusticereport/privateprisonindustrial
complex [https://perma.cc/6M6H-965M]; Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 1998), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/theprison-industrial-complex/304669/ [https://perma.cc/8TPN-KSYK].
175. How to Divest from Immigrant Detention: A Philanthropic Primer, supra note 169.
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that may, in turn, influence these efforts. As GEO Group has acknowledged, “losing the backing of its banking partners ‘could have a material
adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations’ if other investors decide to ditch the industry as well.” 176
Financial divestment from these for-profit detention centers must be
part of the strategy to impact GEO and CoreCivic’s corporate structure.
Both GEO and CoreCivic are established as Real Estate Investment
Trusts (“REITs”) exempt from corporate income taxes. 177 This business
organization permitted GEO Group “to save an estimated $44 million in
2017 alone.” 178 However, because “REITs are required by law to pass
large portions of their incomes back to investors, limiting the amount of
cash they have on hand[,] . . . [the companies] must rely on short-term
loans and lines of credit, making Wall Street financing for private prison
firms a crucial chokepoint of activists.”179
Banks including JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of America,
BNP Paribas, SunTrust, Barclays, Fifth Third Bank, and PNC have publicly committed to ending ties with the private prison and immigrant detention industry, which impacts “an estimated $2.4 [billion] in credit lines
and term loans to industry giants GEO Group and CoreCivic.” 180 Despite
the leadership from some industry leaders, several banks—for example,
Regions, Citizens, Pinnacle Bank, First Tennessee, and Synovus—
continue to support the industry. 181 However, it is not just the banking
industry that can exercise this influence. For instance, the California Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), the state’s largest pension fund, divested $13.7 million from GEO Group and CoreCivic in
October 2019 after “public employees took a stand and made their voices
heard after learning that their retirement savings were propping up the
very companies that have played a critical role in the migrant abuse crisis,
as well as mass incarceration, and the school-to-prison pipeline.” 182
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This is a message that investors, advocacy organizations, and other
partners have been able to successfully champion, 183 with “over 100 grassroots groups . . . pressur[ing] . . . banks with petitions, protests and sitins, building on years of organizing by prison divestment activists.” 184 If
the current trend continues, “CoreCivic and GEO Group stand to lose
72 percent—about $1.9 billion—of their private financing as major banks
commit to divesting from the private prison industry under pressure from
activists.” 185 Direct divestment is only the first step, as these companies
“are heavily invested in ‘alternatives’ to incarceration like ankle monitors
and facial recognition technology that can extend the system of control
and incarceration beyond the walls of a jail or detention center.”186
C. Public Education & Support
As a prerequisite to achieving changes in fiscal or immigration policy, it is necessary to inform and influence public opinion on this issue.
Public opinion translates to community pressure, to build power within
the electorate and influence key actors, whether they be legislators, businesses, or other partners. As discussed above, many public interest organizations, including coalitions of advocacy groups, such as Families Belong
Together, provide resources and help organize community-based campaigns to create this shift.187
Recognizing recent changes in electoral power and public opinion
is a helpful first step. For instance, acknowledging that “[t]he number of
immigrants eligible to vote has risen 93 percent—from 12 million in
2000 to 23.2 million in 2020,” represents a dramatic increase in ballot ac-
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cess. This means that in the next election, one in ten eligible American
voters are immigrants, which is a record high. 189 This power is concentrated—in California (5.5 million), New York (2.5 million), Florida (2.5
million), Texas (1.8 million), and New Jersey (1.2 million)—as approximately six in ten of these 23 million naturalized citizens live in just five
states. 190 But this growth has the power to make a significant difference in
key swing states, like Florida, where 54 percent of the immigrant eligible
voters are Latinx.191
In addition to a changing electorate, public opinion research indicates an increase in support for immigrant communities. One Pew study
found that nearly 60 percent of Americans thought that immigrants make
our country stronger, compared to 34 percent who believe that immigrants are a burden. 192 However, the ability to shift opinion may exist,
even amongst those who oppose immigration, by highlighting the bloated funding to private detention facilities, lack of government transparency, and other problematic aspects of this issue. Thus, framing and messaging is important in helping to galvanize the community’s call for change.
Conclusion
This Article critically assesses the role that litigation under the Thirteenth Amendment can play in rectifying inequities that exist at the intersection of immigration, race, and labor analyzed in the immigration detention context. For immigrants in detention settings, advancing
Thirteenth Amendment litigation, pursuing legislation, and shifting public opinion may provide a remedy. 193 Ultimately, the immigration detention context represents a unique opportunity to reconcile Thirteenth
Amendment litigation with existing case law.
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This litigation also forces us to analyze the true costs of immigration
detention and the widespread lack of transparency and accountability that
allows for the perpetuation of inhumane conditions that dehumanize and
enslave vulnerable individuals in coercive settings. These are people in
the custody of our government. If we as a society are to confine people,
we must ensure it at least is in full compliance with the Constitution. Detention should not be a subsidized venture or lucrative business opportunity, especially not when it is at the expense of those whose forced labor is used to pad profit margins and fund lobbying efforts to maintain
the subjugation of their captive, low-cost workforce.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act litigation provides the mechanism and framework for achieving the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise
that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the
United States.” 194 It also provides a broad, unambiguous basis upon which
to promulgate legislation. The TVPA, passed by Congress in an effort to
eliminate “all badges and incidents of slavery,” can be used to secure the
basic rights and dignity of those incarcerated within our immigration system. Section 1589’s text is as unambiguous as its purpose: to end all involuntary labor obtained “by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person.”195
This litigation is not only an end unto itself, but can also help propel legislation, civic activism, business consciousness, and concrete change.
Our laws do not permit a shroud of secrecy and financial exploitation to shield the abuses of the immigration detention system. Thirteenth
Amendment litigation is the necessary first step in dismantling that structure. If the detention system was forced to bear its own costs, it would
crumble under its own weight. In the wake of both expansion and privatization of immigration detention, the Thirteenth Amendment provides the tools to prevent the ongoing use of forced labor in these facilities, giving full force to the Amendment’s promise to abolish “all badges
and incidents of slavery,” including current manifestations within the
immigration detention system.
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